In December 2025 and January 2026, Iran faces the simultaneous eruption of two profound political and social crises. First, a deepening crisis of governmental legitimacy and effectiveness has triggered a broad wave of nationwide protests. Second, Iran’s regional and international deterrence has been weakened following the Twelve-Day War (Iran-Israel War), placing the United States in a position where limited military intervention is now being seriously considered as a policy option.

This policy brief evaluates the potential consequences of U.S. military intervention and examines whether such action would weaken the government’s internal capacity for repression and shift the balance in favor of domestic social and political actors; or, conversely, whether it would trigger heightened securitization, short-term regime cohesion, and greater regional instability.

In conclusion, the report finds that while U.S. military intervention may yield certain short-term effects, in the absence of organizational capacity and effective political representation within the country; and without a coherent intervention strategy; it is unlikely to produce durable strategic outcomes. Instead, U.S. military intervention would likely generate harmful long-term consequences for the Iranian populations, the Iranian state, and the broader region.

Our policy recommendations emphasize restraints and strategic calibration, prioritizing non-military instruments for long-term change in Iran. For policy makers, we advocate targeted measures that raise the cost of repression without reinforcing the siege-narrative, instead of premature military intervention. This could include international legal action, facilitation of free flow of information, and empowerment of civic actors to drive change from within. For civil society actors inside Iran, we recommend strengthening decentralized and inclusive forms of organization, maintaining independence from foreign political agendas, and selectively leveraging international pressure in support of, rather than in place of, domestic capacity. Finally, for international organizations, we stress the need to move beyond the binary of intervention versus non-intervention. We recommend to closely monitor internal social dynamics, to clearly distinguish pathways to regime change from scenarios of state collapse, and to echo the voice of Iranian civic actors, who should be driving change from within Iran.